Government restrictions have risen in several different ways. Laws and policies restricting religious freedom (such as requiring that religious groups register in order to operate) and government favoritism of religious groups (through funding for religious education, property and clergy, for example) have consistently been the most prevalent types of restrictions globally and in each of the five regions tracked in the study: Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Middle East-North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Both types of restrictions have been rising; the global average score in each of these categories increased more than 20% between 2007 and 2017.
This big-picture view of restrictions on religion comes from a decadelong series of studies by Pew Research Center analyzing the extent to which governments and societies around the world impinge on religious beliefs and practices. Researchers annually comb through more than a dozen publicly available, widely cited sources of information, including annual reports on international religious freedom by the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, as well as publications by a variety of European and UN bodies and several independent, nongovernmental organizations. (See Methodology for more details on sources used in the study.) Due to the availability of the source material and the time it takes to code, each annual Pew Research Center report looks at events that took place about 18 months to two years before its publication. For example, this report covers events that occurred in 2017.
Social hostilities involving religion have been consistently high in the Middle East-North Africa region compared with other regions throughout the length of the study. This is true across all four subcategories of social hostilities.
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"It should be noted that the proclamation does not terminate the states of emergency declared by President Roosevelt on September 8, 1939, and May 27, 1941. Nor does today's action have the effect of terminating the state of war itself. It terminates merely the period of hostilities. With respect to the termination of the national emergency, and the state of war, I shall make recommendations to the Congress in the near future."
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, most of these laws use that. They would terminate with the proclamation at the end of hostilities or 6 months after the end of hostilities. Now termination of the emergency and the termination of the war has to be made by the Congress itself--by legislation.
Farida Mohmand, a former minister of higher education in Afghanistan, says the online university's efforts are commendable. But she says virtual learning will not solve the country's education crisis. "The fundamental solution is to reopen universities for Afghan women as soon as possible," she told Radio Azadi.
The Herat Online School, which provides several thousand school-age girls in Afghanistan with online classes, was launched just weeks after the Taliban seized power. The courses are available free of charge to girls anywhere in Afghanistan or elsewhere with access to the Internet, including Afghan refugees in Iran who have been denied an education.
The U.S.-funded American University of Afghanistan also provides online courses to hundreds of female students who remain in the country. Many of its students and staff fled abroad after the Taliban takeover.
Large parts of Afghanistan have been plunged into darkness in recent weeks after neighboring Uzbekistan halted electricity exports to the country. The power cuts have hit industries hard and delivered another blow to the country's free-falling economy.
Those who insist on the complementarity and exclusivity of combatant and civilian status reply that lawful combatants can be easily identified, based on objective criteria, which they will normally not deny (i.e. membership in the armed forces of a party to an IAC), while the membership and past behaviour of unprivileged combatants and the future threat they represent can only be determined individually. As "civilians", unprivileged combatants may be attacked while they unlawfully directly participate in hostilities. If they fall into the power of the enemy, Convention IV does not bar their punishment for unlawful participation in hostilities. In addition, it permits administrative detention for imperative security reasons. From a teleological perspective, it is feared that the concept of "unlawful combatants", denied the protection of Convention IV, could constitute an easy escape category for detaining powers, as the Geneva Conventions contain no rule about the treatment of someone who is neither a combatant nor a civilian (see, however, Art. 75 P I).
Those who have prisoner-of-war status (and the persons mentioned in GC III, Art. 4(B); GC I, Art. 28(2); P I, Art. 44(5)) enjoy prisoner-of-war treatment. Prisoners of war may be interned without any particular procedure or for no individual reason. The purpose of this internment is not to punish them, but only to hinder their direct participation in hostilities and/or to protect them. Any restriction imposed on them under the very detailed regulations of Convention III serves only this purpose. The protection afforded by those regulations constitutes a compromise between the interests of the detaining power, the interests of the power on which the prisoner depends, and the prisoner's own interests. Under the growing influence of human rights standards, the latter consideration is gaining in importance, but IHL continues to see prisoners of war as soldiers of their country. Due to this inter-State aspect and in their own interest, they cannot renounce their rights or status.[ 6]
As prisoners of war are only detained to stop them from taking part in hostilities, they have to be released and repatriated when they are unable to participate, i.e. during the conflict for health reasons and of course as soon as active hostilities have ended. Under the influence of human rights law and refugee law it is today admitted that those fearing persecution may not be forcibly repatriated. As this exception offers the Detaining Power room for abuse and risks rekindling mutual distrust, it is suggested that the prisoner's wishes are the determining factor, but it can be difficult to ascertain those wishes and what will happen to the prisoner if the Detaining Power is unwilling to grant him/her asylum. On the latter point, many argue that a prisoner of war who freely expresses his/her will not to be repatriated loses prisoner-of-war status and becomes a civilian who remains protected under Convention IV until resettlement.[ 7]
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The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toil of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea:
1. A military demarcation line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a demilitarized zone between the opposing forces. A demilitarized zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.
11. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the demilitarized zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the demilitarized zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the demilitarized zone.
12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this armistice agreement is signed. (See paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this armistice agreement.)/
(a) Within seventy-two (72) hours after this armistice agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the demilitarized zone except as otherwise provided herein. Al demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the demilitarized zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the MAC by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the demilitarized zone as directed by the under the supervision of the MAC. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized forty-five (54) day period to complete salvage operations under MAC and agreed to by the MAC and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone. 2b1af7f3a8